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In recent years, we have seen continued erosion of an individual’s right to
silence. The most recent attempts in the author’s home country, Australia,
include a current proposal to adopt the United Kingdom approach, and allow
inferences to be drawn from a failure to answer questions at an early stage of
investigation, in circumstances where later the person does provide an expla-
nation. An attempt to protect the right to silence in Australia at constitutional
level is challenging, because Australia is one of the few Western nations that has
not seen fit to enact an express bill of rights. This article will consider whether
arguments might be made that, at least in some contexts, infringement of the
right to silence is, nevertheless, contrary to the requirements of the Australian
Constitution.
Courts in other countries around the world have also recognized the right to
silence in some circumstances where legislatures have attempted to limit it, and
these will be considered in the Australian context, acknowledging appropriate
contextual differences. Many countries are faced with the difficulty of recon-
ciling fundamental due process principles with the need for effective investi-
gatory powers sufficient to deal with evolving criminal threats. It will be
instructive to consider how a successful balance has been accommodated in
a range of jurisdictions. It is believed that the law of the author’s home country
could be greatly enriched by engaging with North American and European case
law, as this article will seek to demonstrate. The article is considered to be of
interest to those outside of Australia, to understand the difficulties in protecting
fundamental human rights when an express bill of rights does not exist in the
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relevant country, and to consider how other ways may be found to protect such
rights. In this way, this article will use Australia as the example of a country
without an express bill of rights, and will consider how, in that context, fun-
damental human rights can practically be protected by the courts. The con-
clusions are considered relevant to a range of nations. Specific examples include
Singapore and Malaysia, and to a lesser extent India, as will be explained.
Keywords: right to silence, due process, privilege against self-incrimination,
fair trial
I N TRODUCT ION
Debate about the extent to which a person, including a person accused of
a crime, has a ‘‘right’’ to withhold information when pressed to provide it is
not new. The law has taken a number of different positions on this issue over
the centuries. It is understandable that law enforcement bodies might wish to
see this right abrogated since it no doubt makes their job more difficult.1
Some are quick to draw a conclusion that a person would only avail them-
selves of a right to silence if they ‘‘have something to hide.’’2 It is difficult to
reconcile departures from the right to silence with other fundamental doc-
trines of the criminal law, and the danger, as always, is that allowing depar-
tures from fundamental principles in limited cases may elicit a clamor for
departure in more and more cases, until the very existence of the principle
may, in some cases, itself be in doubt. Jurisdictions around the world have
had to balance these competing issues and principles. As always, it is useful to
see how they have done so. Care must always be taken to acknowledge the
1. Justice Olsson of the Supreme Court of South Australia lamented that ‘‘the right to
silence at trial creates problems for judicial administration and precludes effective trial
management.’’ To HowMuch Silence Ought an Accused be Entitled? 8 J. JUD. ADMIN. 131, 132
(1999) (Justice Olsson also stated it was desirable that the privilege against self-incrimination
should continue).
2. One exponent was Jeremy Bentham: ‘‘between delinquency on the one hand, and
silence under enquiry on the other, there is a manifest connection; a connection too natural
not to be constant and inseparable.’’ JOHN BOWRING, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM,
Vol. 7 at 446 (1838–1843); JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE, Vol.
5 at 229–41 (1978) (criticizing the exclusion of self-incriminating evidence and reflecting
utilitarian philosophy); SUSAN EASTON, Justifications of the Right to Silence: Rights Versus
Utility, in THE CASE FOR THE RIGHT TO SILENCE (1998).
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different constitutional and/or human rights settings in which such rulings
have been made, in order to properly consider the extent to which the law of
any particular country is or should be influenced by such developments.
This article is divided into five parts. Part I traces a brief history of the
right in England, explains its different possible meanings and applications,
as well as the various theoretical rationales that have been suggested to
underpin it. Part II considers how the right has been accepted and applied
in Australian case law, and Part III considers how it has been abridged by
Australian statute. Part IV considers how the right has been interpreted and
applied in overseas jurisdictions. Part V suggests how the right should be
interpreted in Australian law in future, and in summary, the paper outlines
the lessons learned from the international comparison and draws conclu-
sions. The major focus in the article will be infringements of the right to
silence at a stage prior to trial because it is contended that the need for
change in the current law is greatest there, but the reasoning will also be
applicable to trial proceedings.3
I . PREL IM INAR IES
A. Brief History of the Right to Silence4
It is considered necessary to articulate this history briefly to show the
longstanding and fundamental nature of the right, and how and why it
came into existence. Abrogation of the right should be seen in light of the
tortuous process by which the right was eventually recognized, its recog-
nition for several centuries, and its importance in ensuring that an accused
person is treated fairly and in accordance with due process. In the following
paragraphs, this tortuous process is briefly sketched.
Compulsion in criminal procedure was apparent even prior to the
early thirteenth century in England in forced participation in a trial by
3. Some argue that the right to silence pretrial is even stronger than the right to silence at
trial. Mirko Bagaric, The Diminishing ‘‘Right’’ of Silence, 19 SYDNEY L. REV. 366, 380 (1997).
4. I am indebted to several sources in making this brief summary: LEONARD LEVY,
ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION (1968);
E.M. Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34MINN. L. REV. 1 (1949); Gregory
O’Reilly, England Limits the Right to Silence and Moves Towards an Inquisitorial System of
Justice, 85(2) J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 402 (1994); GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE PROOF
OF GUILT: A STUDY OF THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL (1958).
THE R IGHT TO S ILENCE | 529
compurgation, involving the saying of an oath, and trial by ordeal.
A mistake in the saying of the oath indicated guilt, as did loss in the trial
by ordeal. These practices fell into disuse, to be replaced by common law
courts and ecclesiastical courts. The common law courts adopted an ac-
cusatorial system, whereby those accusing the person of wrongdoing at-
tended proceedings and gave their evidence. The accused person did not
provide evidence during these proceedings, and could not be compelled to
do so, except in succession and family law matters. The ecclesiastical
courts, which heard a broad range of matters including alleged sexual
impropriety and public order type offenses, adopted an inquisitorial sys-
tem. In this system, the accused person was in effect required to answer the
questions put by the interrogator. Failure to do so could be taken to be
guilt, in some cases punishable by life imprisonment, or contempt. The
accused was not informed of the charge, their accuser(s), or the evidence
used against them.
In the latter part of the sixteenth century, the English Crown became
more involved in administering ecclesiastical matters, with religious viola-
tions becoming treasonable. It adopted ecclesiastical processes, including
the inquisitorial system, in this context. Two particular tribunals were the
infamous Court of the Star Chamber and Court of the High Commission.
The bodies came to enforce not only religious, but political, orthodoxy.
They used inquisitorial techniques, evidence from unknown sources, and
torture to meet their objectives.
Objections to such processes began to be heard. There is a reference in
1568 to Lord Chief Justice Dyer of the Court of Common Pleas granting
a writ of habeas corpus to prevent a prisoner from being required to take
the oath. In this case, known as Leigh’s Case, Dyer stated that no man
shall be required to produce evidence against himself. Others at the time,
including Morice, claimed that the use of inquisitorial techniques vio-
lated the Magna Carta, which required criminal proceedings to be gov-
erned by the law of the land as established by Parliament, not the Crown
and its special courts. He claimed that Parliament had passed a law in 1534
prohibiting bishops from using inquisitorial techniques. However, the
Crown did not accept that the common law and Magna Carta limited its
sovereignty, a consistent theme leading up to the Glorious Revolution of
1688.
Lord Coke sought to reassert the superiority of the common law courts,
to limit the jurisdiction of the Crown bodies, and to make the Crown
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bodies fall into line in the procedures they used in dealing with accusations.5
King James responded by dismissing Lord Coke in 1616. However, his ideas
had influence. The use of inquisitorial processes in the Court of Star Cham-
ber was limited to cases of misdemeanors, and the accused was required to be
given the charge(s) against them. The Court of High Commission barred
compulsion in criminal cases.
Inquisitorial type processes enjoyed something of a resurgence in the
early seventeenth century under Charles I. Those who refused to answer
questions were considered to have confessed to the truth of the allegations
against them. However, a turning point arrived with the proceedings
against Lilburne, charged with importing seditious books. At his trial in
the Star Chamber, he refused to answer questions on the express basis that
he may hurt himself in so doing. He was jailed for contempt and sentenced
to corporal punishment. At his flogging, he apparently preached to the
crowd about the injustice of what has happening to him. In 1641, Parlia-
ment ruled Lilburne’s sentence to be illegal, abolished the Court of Star
Chamber and Court of High Commission, and barred inquisitorial pro-
ceedings in criminal cases. In 1688, the very year of the Glorious Revolu-
tion, James II prosecuted seven bishops for defying his law preventing
prosecution of nonconformists. Ironically enough, given the history of
proceedings in ecclesiastical courts, one of the bishops, Sancroft, when
confronted by allegations he disobeyed James II’s law, claimed a right not
to say anything that might incriminate him. The right to silence had
become entrenched in the English common law.6
5. One example of this occurred in Fuller’s Case, where Coke limited the jurisdiction of
the Crown bodies to ecclesiastical offenses only, and they were subject to having their
jurisdiction limited by the common law courts. Coke stated that Magna Carta applied to the
proceedings in the Crown courts and rejected the use of inquisitorial proceedings in such
trials.
6. Other important historical developments occurred in 1898 with the Criminal Evi-
dence Act, when the rules were changed to allow the accused to testify if they wished. Until
then, the accused was not competent to give evidence at the trial even if they wished to do
so. The Judges’ Rules, revised in 1964, required police to administer a caution regarding the
suspect’s right to silence. In 1994, the British Parliament enacted the Criminal Justice and
Public Order Act, allowing inferences from the failure of an accused to answer questions.
The same Parliament (though differently constituted) enacted the Human Rights Act 1998
(UK), guaranteeing the right to a fair trial, which includes the privilege against self-
incrimination.
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The fundamental nature of the right to silence has continued to be
recognized in constitutional law and human rights contexts since that time.
It is expressly referred to in the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution,7 § 14(3)(g) of the International Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights,8 § 8(2)(g) of the American Convention on Human Rights,
§ 11(c) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982, § 25(d) of
the New Zealand Bill of Rights 1990, and the subnational human rights
instruments in Australia.9 The right is not specifically referred to in the
European Convention on Human Rights, but as we will see later, it has
been considered as part of the right to a fair trial, which is expressly
provided for in Article 6 of that Convention. It will be seen that this
recognition is particularly important in the Australian context.
B. The Dimensions and Theoretical Basis of the ‘‘Right to Silence’’
Although it is convenient to refer to the common law ‘‘right to silence,’’10
the risk is that this means different things to different people, and confu-
sion may arise if it is assumed to have a common meaning. Different
threads of the concept of the so-called right to silence were identified by
Lord Mustill in the English case of R v. Director of Serious Fraud Office; Ex
Parte Smith.11 They include (a) a general immunity possessed by all persons
and bodies from being compelled on pain of punishment to answer ques-
tions posed by other persons or bodies; (b) a general immunity, possessed
7. The Fifth Amendment includes a prohibition on a person being ‘‘compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself.’’
8. This right (‘‘not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt’’) is in
the context of a criminal charge, and is stated to be a minimum guarantee provided to each
individual in full equality.
9. § 22(2)(i) of the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) and § 25(2)(k) of the Charter of
Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic); these are in the context of declaration of
incompatibility schemes (only).
10. For the purposes of this article, the author will not continue to place in inverted
commas (i.e., quotation marks) the phrase ‘‘right to silence’’ because as indicated here, it is
something of an umbrella principle referring to a range of different rights. In terms of the
different rights referred to in Ex Parte Smith, the focus in this article is particularly on rights
(a)–(c), but much of the article is also applicable to rights (d)–(f) and associated rights.
11. [1993] AC 1, 30–31. This passage was quoted with evident approval by Mason CJ and
Toohey J in Environment Protection Authority v. Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd (1993) 178 CLR
477, 503 and by Gaudron ACJ, Gummow Kirby and Hayne JJ in RPS v. The Queen (2000)
199 CLR 620, 630.
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by all persons or bodies, from being compelled on pain or punishment to
answer questions the answers to which may incriminate them; (c) a specific
immunity, possessed by all persons under suspicion of criminal responsi-
bility, while being interviewed by police officers or others in similar posi-
tions of authority, from being compelled on pain of punishment to answer
questions of any kind; (d) a specific immunity, possessed by accused per-
sons undergoing trial, from being compelled to give evidence, and from
being compelled to answer questions put to them in the dock; (e) a specific
immunity, possessed by persons who have been charged with a criminal
offense, from having questions material to the offense addressed to them by
police officers or persons in a similar position of authority; and (f) a specific
immunity, at least in some cases, possessed by accused persons undergoing
trial, from having adverse comment made on any failure to answer ques-
tions before trial or to give evidence at the trial. For word limit reasons, the
focus here will be in particular on the context of (a) to (c) above, but it is
important to recognize the wider context, and much of the discussion is
also relevant in that wider context.
This list could be supplemented with other strands, for example that any
confession obtained from an accused be one that is given voluntarily, that
the evidence used should be reliable, the court’s discretion to discard the
use of evidence where, in all the circumstances, it would be unfair to take it
into account (including issues of prejudice), and a general public policy
exclusion.12 The court also has the inherent power to avoid abuse of
process. Questions about the extent to which police administered a caution
to the interviewee about the fact that they need not cooperate, the con-
sequences of answering questions, and whether or not the conversation was
being recorded are also relevant.13
There are obviously close links between a right to silence and the pre-
sumption of innocence.14 The rationale for these kinds of rules can also be
12. The Queen v. Swaffield (1998) 192 CLR 159, 188–89 (Toohey Gaudron and Gummow
JJ); R v. Tofilau (2007) 231 CLR 396, 402 (Gleeson CJ); Ridgeway v. The Queen (1995) 184
CLR 19; Bunning v. Cross (1978) 141 CLR 54.
13. Carr v. Western Australia (2007) 232 CLR 138.
14.Quinn v. Ireland [2000] ECHR 690, [40]. Presumption of innocence is protected by
Article 14(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 11.1 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 6(2) of the European Convention on
Human Rights, § 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and § 25(c) of the
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.
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sourced in the fact that the authorities have substantial resources at their
disposal in prosecuting allegations, compared with those against whom
such power might be exercised. This power imbalance can be used against
the individual through pressure to conform to the questioner’s way of
thinking. It is contrary to the investigator’s interests to afford the right
to silence, so rationally it can’t be expected that the right will be extended
to the person questioned in the absence of a legal requirement. It reflects
a libertarian perspective that interferences with personal liberty must be
confined within agreed limits, that many investigations surround alleged
criminal activity, and that the consequences of proving criminal behavior are
often dire, including imprisonment for the accused. Respect for dignity and
privacy of individuals is also reflected in the principle.15 There may be
entirely valid reasons for silence, other than guilt.16 It rejects a utilitarian
philosophy that in order to provide for a safer society, incursions on funda-
mental rights such as the right to silence are necessary for the greater good.
I I . AUSTRAL IAN CASE LAW ON THE R IGHT TO S I LENCE
The extent of Australian case law on the right to silence will now be
summarized. This is necessary to point out what are considered to be the
deficiencies in the existing approach. The article will then consider how
various legislatures in Australia have used the less-than-watertight protec-
tion of this right to progressively erode the right in a range of contexts.
Specific detail is necessary to convey the number and range of ways in
which this right is being eroded by various Australian legislatures.
The High Court of Australia has declared that it is a fundamental
principle that the prosecution ‘‘cannot compel the accused to assist it in
15. Andrew Ashworth, Self-Incrimination In European Human Rights Law—A Pregnant
Pragmatism?, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 751, 767–69 (2008); Mike Redmayne, Rethinking the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 27(2) OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 209 (2007); Ian
Dennis, Instrumental Protection, Human Right or Functional Necessity? Reassessing the Priv-
ilege Against Self-Incrimination, 54(2) CAMBRIDGE L.J. 342, 348–53 (1995); Hamish Stewart,
The Confessions Rule and the Charter, 54 MCGILL L.J. 517 (2009); Simon Matters, Anything
You Don’t Say May Be Given in Evidence: Protecting the Interests of Justice or Emasculating
a Fundamental Right?, 4(1) DEAKIN L. REV. 49 (1997).
16. These are well summarized in the Australian Law Reform Commission Report
entitled Criminal Investigation (1975), { 150; Dyson Heydon, Silence as Evidence, 1MONASH
U. L. REV. 53, 55 (1975).
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any way,’’17 closely linked with the presumption of innocence and the onus
of proof. Sometimes the Court has used the language of the ‘‘freedom to
speak’’ and that if such a right has been impugned, evidence obtained as
a result may not be admitted. This occurred in The Queen v. Swaffield,18
where an undercover police officer obtained a confession from an accused.
A majority of the Court rejected the use of the evidence. For instance, the
joint reasons stated,
In the light of recent decisions in this Court, it is no great step to recognise
. . . an approach which looks to the accused’s freedom to choose to speak to
the police and the extent to which that freedom has been impugned. Where
the freedom has been impugned the court has a discretion to reject the
evidence. In deciding whether to exercise that discretion . . . the court will
look at all the circumstances. Those circumstances may point to unfairness
to the accused if the confession is admitted.
It is not necessary that the accused has made a conscious decision not to
exercise their right to silence. This has meant that the use of police decep-
tion in order to extract damning evidence from an accused has been indi-
rectly validated by the acceptance of the evidence gained through such
a process.19 Evidence derived from a public conversation between police
and an accused, in circumstances where the accused was not aware that the
conversation was being recorded, has been admitted.20
InHammond v. Commonwealth of Australia,21 the High Court was faced
with provisions in some ways very similar to the Commonwealth and State
legislation alluded to above. Specifically, a provision of the Royal Commis-
sions Act 1902 (Cth) made it an offense for a witness before a Commission
17. Environmental Protection Authority v. Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd (1993) 178 CLR
477, 527 (Deane Dawson and Gaudron JJ).
18. (1998) 192 CLR 159, 202 (Toohey Gaudron and Gummow JJ); Kirby J to like effect
(209).
19. R v. Tofilau (2007) 231 CLR 396 (confessions made to undercover police officers who
pose as criminals and tell the accused that in order to join their group, they must make a full
confession; whereupon the ‘‘boss’’ of the group will make the problem go away, involving
the use of corrupt police—use of such evidence permitted by majority, Kirby J dissenting).
20. Em v. The Queen (2007) 232 CLR 671 (Kirby J dissenting); Carr v. The Queen
(2007) 232 CLR 138 (accused was at the lockup, and made admissions there, not realizing
that activity in that area was being recorded—evidence admissible according to the Court,
Kirby J dissenting).
21. (1982) 152 CLR 188.
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to refuse to answer questions put to them. There was a section of the Act
precluding the use of the information provided by the witness in civil or
criminal proceedings against them, apart from proceedings for a breach of
the Act. The Victorian evidence legislation at the time (Evidence Act 1958
(Vic)) also made it an offense for a person present before a board appointed
by the Governor to refuse to answer a question relating to the inquiry.
Again, the provision restricted the use to which the information provided
under such compulsion could be used. Hammond had been summoned to
appear at the Commission to answer questions about an alleged conspiracy.
He declined to answer them on the basis he might incriminate himself. The
Commissioner directed Hammond to answer the questions. Hammond,
who had been charged with conspiracy offenses shortly after the Commission
had been established, successfully challenged in the High Court the validity
of the Commission proceedings.
The Court enjoined the Commission proceedings. In the course of
doing so, each commented adversely on the compulsive nature of the
Commission proceedings and their implications for the privilege against
self-incrimination. Gibbs CJ stated,
It would be necessary to find a clear expression of intention before one could
conclude that the legislature intended to override so important a privilege as
that against self-incrimination. . . .Once it is accepted that the plaintiff will
be bound, on pain of punishment, to answer questions designed to establish
that he is guilty of the offence with which he is charged, it seems to be
inescapably to follow, in the circumstances of this case, that there is a real
risk that the administration of justice will be interfered with. . . . It is true
that the . . . answers may not be used at the criminal trial. Nevertheless the
fact that the plaintiff has been examined, in detail, as to the circumstances of
the alleged offence, is very likely to prejudice him in his defence.22
Murphy J claimed that the privilege against self-incrimination was so
pervasive as to be unnecessary to state it in statutes that require persons to
answer questions, and that it was presumed to exist unless excluded by
unmistakable language.23 It was necessary to prohibit the Commission
from ordering Hammond to answer questions that might tend to incrim-
inate him ‘‘to maintain the integrity of the administration of the judicial
22. Id. at 197–98; Mason J agreed with the reasons of Gibbs CJ.
23. Id. at 200.
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power of the Commonwealth.’’24 Similarly, Brennan J commented on the
deep-rooted nature of the right, concluding that it was not to be thought
that Parliament, in arming a Commission with powers, intended that the
power might be exercised to deny fundamental principles in criminal
justice like the privilege against self-incrimination.25 Deane J said that the
fact Hammond had been charged after refusing to answer questions
amounted to ‘‘injustice and prejudice to the plaintiff.’’26
The Commonwealth Parliament then amended the Act to expressly
state that during the royal commission proceedings, a person was not
entitled to refuse or fail to answer questions on the ground that the answer
might incriminate him. Lamentably (in the author’s view), the High Court
relented. All members of the High Court in Sorby and Another v. Common-
wealth of Australia27 validated the amending provision. The so-called ‘‘deep-
rooted’’ right, the ‘‘cardinal principle,’’28 did not survive a thirty-nine-word
amending provision. One interesting point of disagreement in the case con-
cerned the application of the privilege against self-incrimination in a case
such as this where, unlike in Hammond, the relevant person had not been
charged and matters were not before the court. Four members of the
Court held that the privilege could apply to executive proceedings such as
the one considered here, and that it was not confined to judicial proceed-
ings.29 A majority also discarded any link between the privilege against
self-incrimination and the requirements of Chapter III of the Australian
Constitution.30
24. Id. at 201.
25. Id. at 203.
26. Id. at 207.
27. (1983) 152 CLR 281.
28. ‘‘It is a cardinal principle of our system of justice that the Crown must prove the guilt
of an accused person, and the protection which that principle affords to the liberty of the
individual will be weakened if power exists to compel a suspected person to confess his guilt’’
(Gibbs CJ (id. at 294), who validated the amending provision expressly taking away the
privilege against self-incrimination).
29. Mason Wilson and Dawson JJ (id. at 309), Murphy J (311); Brennan J contra (321),
Gibbs CJ not directly addressing this question.
30. ‘‘[T]he privilege against self-incrimination is not an integral element in the exercise of
the judicial power reposed in the courts by Chapter III of the Constitution’’ (Mason Wilson
and Dawson JJ, id. at 308); Gibbs CJ, ‘‘the privilege against self-incrimination is not
protected by the Constitution’’ (298).
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The High Court of Australia is divided on the extent to which the
privilege may be claimed in nonjudicial proceedings.31 In Pyneboard Pty
Ltd v. Trade Practices Commission,32 Mason ACJ Wilson and Dawson JJ
stated they weren’t prepared to hold that the privilege was incapable of
application in nonjudicial proceedings. However, Brennan J found the
privilege was confined to judicial proceedings.33
On the question of the extent to which silence can be used to draw
conclusions unfavorable to the accused at trial,34 the High Court has
generally taken the view that the judge or prosecutor should not suggest
to the jury that the accused’s silence may be used as evidence of guilt.35 It
has reiterated that it would seldom, if ever, be reasonable to conclude that
31. The issue was not directly addressed in Hammond; there is a view that a royal
commission might, depending on its enabling legislation, be conducting at least a quasi-
judicial function: Lockwood v. Commonwealth of Australia (1954) 90 CLR 177 (Fullagar J,
sitting as a single judge, concluded the Royal Commission there was not in fact exercizing
judicial power, though its proceedings had some of the trappings of an exercise of judicial
power).
32. Pyneboard (1983) 152 CLR 328, 341; Murphy J held it applied to judicial and non-
judicial functions (id. at 346); see also Kempley v. The King [1944] ALR 249, 253 (Starke J)
and 254 (Williams J).
33. Pyneboard, id. at 354; see also Kempley, id. at 251 (Latham CJ) and 253 (McTiernan J).
34. Evidence statutes generally allow a judge to comment on the defendant’s failure to
give evidence, but not suggest it was because the defendant is guilty: Evidence Act 1995
(Cth) § 20, Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) § 20, Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) § 20, Evidence Act
2001 (Tas) § 20, and Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) § 20. In South Australia, the prosecutor
cannot make a comment about the defendant’s failure to give evidence; Evidence Act 1929
(SA) § 18(1)(b)). The main focus of this article is the right to silence at a stage prior to trial,
although many of the principles applicable at that time would also be applicable during trial.
Comparisons between the right pretrial and during trial appear in Bagaric, supra note 3;
Scott Henchliffe, The Silent Accused at Trial: Consequences of an Accused’s Failure to Give
Evidence in Australia, 19 U. QUEENSLAND L.J. 137 (1997).
35. Petty v. The Queen (1991) 173 CLR 95, 99 (Mason CJ Deane Toohey and McHugh
JJ); the Court was more equivocal in Weissensteiner v. The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 217, 229
(‘‘silence in the face of an accusation when an answer might reasonably be expected can
amount to an admission by conduct’’ (Mason CJ Deane and Dawson JJ, 229); ‘‘the failure to
explain can amount to evidence’’ (Gaudron McHugh JJ, 245)). See for discussion Elizabeth
Stone, Calling a Spade a Spade: The Embarrassing Truth About the Right to Silence, 22 CRIM.
L.J. 17 (1998). Barbara Hocking & Laura Leigh Manville, What of the Right to Silence: Still
Supporting the Presumption of Innocence, or a Growing Legal Fiction?, 1 MACQUARIE L.J. 63
(2001); Henchliffe, supra note 34; Bagaric, supra note 3; Note: RPS v R: The Resilience of the
Accused’s Right to Silence, 22 SYDNEY L. REV. 669 (2000).
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an accused in a criminal trial be expected to give evidence.36 As indicated
earlier, the Court has recognized a broad discretion to discard evidence
obtained in circumstances of general unfairness; this has included exclud-
ing evidence obtained after the person from whom it was taken indicated to
authorities he did not wish to answer questions.37
In summary, the case law does not reveal that the right is strongly
protected. A valid law of Parliament is effective, according to the High
Court in Sorby, to abrogate the right. The article will now point out the
ways in which various legislatures in Australia have used the situation
reflected in the case law to progressively undermine the right to silence.
I I I . AUSTRAL IAN STATUTORY ABROGAT IONS OF THE
R IGHT TO S I LENCE
There has been a gradual departure from the common law right to silence
in a range of Australian statutes. This led the Independent National Secu-
rity Legislation Monitor to comment recently that given the many exam-
ples of statutory abrogation of the right, the issue
cannot be given top priority. . . . It does seem as if the pass has been sold on
statutory abrogations of this privilege.38
No doubt, the right to silence is inconvenient to law enforcement
authorities who sometimes struggle to obtain the necessary evidence to
back their suspicions about wrongful activity, and it makes their job much
easier if suspects or witnesses become compelled to cooperate on pain of
punishment, rather than remaining silent and forcing the prosecutors to
proof by other means. Some utilitarian arguments press that in order to
stop particular crimes, such as terrorism, unusual measures that remove
fundamental rights are necessary and justified. This debate has also
36. RPS v. The Queen (2000) 199 CLR 620, 632 (Gaudron ACJ, Gummow, Kirby and
Hayne JJ); cf. Weissensteiner v. The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 217, 229: ‘‘silence in the face of
an accusation when an answer might reasonably be expected can amount to an admission by
conduct’’ (Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ); see also Gaudron and McHugh JJ (245),
referring to the possibility of failure to explain being evidence.
37. The Queen v. Swaffield (1998) 192 CLR 159; R v. Belford and Bound [2011] QCA 43;
cf. Em v. The Queen (2007) 232 CLR 671.
38. Annual Report at 33 (2011) (Bret Walker SC).
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occurred in the context of the use of torture to obtain information that
might, for instance, thwart a terrorist attack. Questions arise about whether
the end justifies the means.
There are numerous examples of Australian statutes where the common
law right to silence has been abrogated at a stage prior to any trial, both
terrorism related and not. It is worth setting these out in some detail, since
no standard model is apparent and different issues are raised by the differ-
ent approaches. This also gives us an idea of the scale of departure that has
taken place; we are talking about numerous actual examples in many
contexts, not isolated instances. Fears about the erosion of this fundamen-
tal right are not far-fetched or fanciful.
The most recent example in an Act occurs in the new Australian work-
place health and safety model laws.39 Section 171 of these Acts allows
a workplace inspector to enter a workplace. The inspector can require the
production of documents and answers to questions.40 A person or organi-
zation not complying with the inspector’s requests can be fined up to
$10,000 or $50,000 respectively, unless they have reasonable excuse for
the noncompliance.41 The Acts expressly state that the privilege against
self-incrimination is not available as an excuse. However, any information
provided is not generally admissible as evidence against the person who
provided it, unless the proceedings concern the alleged falseness of the
answer or information given. A warning must be given to the person or
organization about the inspector’s powers under § 171, about the fact that
a failure to comply with a request is punishable by fine, and that the general
privilege against self-incrimination is not available as a defense.42 This
example is somewhat atypical, in that it occurs in a context of corporate
compliance, whereas the remaining examples take place in the context of
proceedings against an individual. It is fair to suggest that the need for
protection of this right might be thought to be stronger in the latter context,
given that a corporation may be much better informed and resourced to
defend their interests in such cases, compared with an individual.
39. Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (NSW), Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Qld),
Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (ACT), and Work Health and Safety (National Uniform
Legislation) Act 2011 (NT). Other states have not yet implemented their legislation.
40. Work Health and Safety Acts, id. at § 171(1)(b) and (c).
41. Id. at § 171(6).
42. Id. at § 173.
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In the security context, § 34L of the Australian Security Intelligence
Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) requires a person to appear for questioning
once a warrant is issued or direction given under the Act. Failure to appear
is an offense punishable by a maximum jail term of five years. A person must
not fail to give any information, record, or thing requested, if they have it.43
It is specifically not a defense that the information or thing withheld would
tend to incriminate the person. However, that information, record, or thing
would not be admissible in evidence against the person in criminal proceed-
ings (other than those for breach of that section). Section 23 of the Act allows
an authorized person to request information from the operator or an aircraft
or vessel, in the form of documents or the answering of questions, relevant to
the vessel or aircraft, voyage or passengers, and so forth. The requestee must
comply,44 on pain of penalty,45 unless they have a reasonable excuse.46
There are no express limits on the use of information gleaned from such
a process. The Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) contains some incursions on the
privilege against self-incrimination in the security context.47
Section 30 of the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth) also
requires persons summoned to attend an examination. It is an offense not
43. § 34L(2), (6). There is an evidential burden on the person affected to show they do
not have the relevant information, record, or thing (§ 34L(3), (7)). See also, in the context of
documents thought to relate to terrorism or other serious offenses, § 3ZQN and § 3ZQO of
the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth).
44. § 23(2) of Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth).
45. Id. at § 23(3).
46. Id. at § 23(5); similar provisions are found in § 3ZQM(4) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth).
47. As well as those noted above, see § 3UC of the Act, allowing police to ask an
individual for their name and address, evidence of identity, and reason for being at a par-
ticular Commonwealth place. The officer must explain to the individual that the officer is
authorized to make this kind of request, and that it may be an offense not to comply with
the request. Failure to comply with the request is punishable by 20 penalty units (§ 3UC(2))
unless there is reasonable excuse. It may be considered to be an offense under § 149.1 of the
Criminal Code 1995 (Cth), hindering a public official in the administration of their duties,
which attracts a possible two-year jail term. Otherwise, that Act requires officers generally to
indicate that those they wish to question have a general right to silence (§ 23F), and it
reaffirms the general application of the ‘‘right to silence’’ (§ 23S). For discussion see Sarah
Sorial, The Use and Abuse of Power and Why We Need a Bill of Rights: The ASIO (Terrorism)
Amendment Act 2003 (Cth) and the Case of R v Ul-Haque, 34 MONASH U. L. REV. 400
(2008); Jude McCulloch & Joo-Cheong Tham, Secret State, Transparent Subject: The
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation in the Age of Terror, 38 AUSTRALIAN & NEW
ZEALAND J. CRIMINOLOGY 400 (2005).
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to attend, or to attend but fail to answer questions or produce requested
documents.48 This is punishable by a maximum penalty of 200 penalty
units or up to five years’ imprisonment. Subsection five limits the way in
which such information can be used: it is generally not admissible against
the person in criminal proceedings or those involving a penalty, other than
confiscation proceedings or those relating to the alleged falsity of the
information given. However, that subsection is itself limited by subsection
four: in relation to an answer to a question, the person answering must have
stated, before they provide the information, that they believe the answer
might incriminate them.49 In relation to a document provided, that sec-
tion is limited to cases where the relevant document contains only infor-
mation relating to the person’s earnings through a business, and again only
when they expressly state, before they provide the information, that they
believe the document might incriminate them. One limit recently con-
firmed by the Court is that a person who has been charged with an
indictable offense, where the trial has not occurred, cannot be subject to
the compulsory questioning process indicated above. This rule applies
regardless of whether or not the answers obtained through such question-
ing can be used at the subsequent trial.50 On balance, the limits on the use
of incriminating information or documents against the person who pro-
vided such information or documents are few.
Various state anticorruption bodies impose similar requirements. For
instance, § 75 of the Crime and Misconduct Act 2001 (Qld) allows the
Chair of the Crime and Misconduct Commission to require a person to
provide oral or written information relevant to a misconduct investigation
that is in the person’s possession, and/or to produce documents that are in
the person’s possession. The person must comply, and the section makes
no provision for a defense to noncompliance of reasonable excuse.51 Very
limited protections are given to the person involved; they do not, by
complying with this requirement, put themselves in jeopardy of a prosecu-
tion on the basis of privacy or secrecy breach, and they incur no civil
liability with respect to the information, thing, or document provided.52
48. § 30(2) and (3) of the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth).
49. Id. at § 30(4)(c).
50. X7 v. Australian Crime Commission [2013] HCA 29.
51. This is punishable by up to 85 penalty units or one year’s imprisonment.
52. § 75(4) of the Crime and Misconduct Act 2001 (Qld).
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Privilege is mentioned as a defense, but the Act defines it in such a way, in
terms of a misconduct investigation to which § 75 relates, to exclude the
privilege against self-incrimination.53
The New South Wales anticorruption legislation54 contains similar
provisions, including a power vested in the Commission to require a public
authority or public official to produce a document or documents, or state-
ment of information.55 It is an offense to fail to produce the document(s)
or supply the requested information unless there is a reasonable excuse.56
Statements of information, documents, and things tending to incriminate
the person cannot be used in proceedings against the person, except pro-
ceedings for a breach of the Act, provided the person objects to producing
them at the time. As with the Australian Crime Commission provisions,
the self-incrimination protection applies only where the person expressly
states at the time that they wish to avail themselves of it.
In Western Australia, the Act allows the Corruption and Crime Com-
mission to issue a summons to a person, requiring them to attend at a certain
time and to give evidence and/or produce documentation.57 It is a contempt
of the Commission, treated as equivalent to contempt of court, to fail to
attend and give the required evidence, or to fail to produce the required
document(s), without reasonable excuse.58 Section 157 specifically states that
claiming infringement on the priviledge against self-incrimination is not
a reasonable excuse for failing to produce a document or thing.59
53. The Schedule 2 Dictionary definition of ‘‘privilege’’ differs according to whether the
context is crime investigation, witness protection, or confiscation proceedings (in which case
‘‘privilege’’ does include privilege against self-incrimination), and in the context of misconduct
proceedings (in which case ‘‘privilege’’ does not include privilege against self-incrimination).
54. Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988 (NSW).
55. Id. at §§ 21 and 22.
56. Id. at §§ 82 and 83.
57. § 96 of the Corruption and Crime Commission Act 2003 (Western Australia);
further power appears in § 94 (to require a public authority or public official to produce
a statement of information) and § 95 (to require a person to produce a record). § 94(5)
contains a limited recognition of the privilege against self-incrimination, stating that infor-
mation derived by a public official pursuant to that section is not admissible against that
person except with respect to contempt proceedings, proceedings for a breach of that Act, or
disciplinary action.
58. Id. at §§ 158 and § 159 of the Act.
59. It does not state, when considering whether a person has failed to attend and/or give
evidence at a hearing pursuant to a § 96 summons, whether the defense there of ‘‘reasonable
excuse’’ could include the privilege against self-incrimination.
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At trial, evidence legislation provides that an accused person generally
need not answer questions.60 Exceptionally, in Queensland § 15(1) of the
Evidence Act 1977 states that in a criminal proceeding, the accused cannot
refuse to answer a question on the ground that it might incriminate
them.61 The Western Australian Act also provides that a witness may be
compelled by the court to provide what would otherwise be incriminating
evidence, if the judge issues a certificate precluding the use of the evidence
against that person.62 Evidence legislation also limits the extent to which
the court can comment about the accused’s failure to give evidence.63
There has been talk that some Australian States might adopt the
approach of the United Kingdom legislation in allowing use to be made
of the failure of an accused to render an explanation of events earlier in
proceedings. After much controversy, legislation to effect this change, the
Evidence Amendment (Evidence of Silence) Act 2013 (NSW), passed
recently. The Act amends the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) to allow courts,
in hearing proceedings for serious indictable offenses, to make an inference
against a person, if the person remains silent about something at the inves-
tigatory stage but then leads it at trial, in circumstances where they might
reasonably have been expected to mention it to authorities at the investiga-
tory stage.64 The Act requires that the individual has been cautioned, and
60. This is commonly expressed in terms that the accused is neither competent nor
compellable as a witness for the prosecution: § 17 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), § 17 Evidence
Act 1995 (NSW), § 17 Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), § 17 Evidence Act 2001 (Tas), § 17 Evidence
Act 2011 (ACT).
61. Cf. the Northern Territory Evidence Act, § 10 of which expressly preserves the
privilege against self-incrimination.
62. § 11 of the Evidence Act 1906 (WA). The evidence regimes elsewhere do contain
provision for this certificate system in relation to precluding the use of otherwise incrimi-
nating evidence against a witness who claims they wish to assert the privilege, but they are
much more limited. Specifically, they do not apply in relation to the accused, where the
information relates to whether they did an act, made an omission or had a state of mind
relevant to a fact in issue: § 128(10) Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), Evidence Act 1995 (NSW),
Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), Evidence Act 2001 (Tas), and Evidence Act 2011 (ACT).
63. § 20 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), § 20 Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), § 20 Evidence Act
2008 (Vic), § 20 Evidence Act 2001 (Tas), and § 20 Evidence Act 2011 (ACT). In South
Australia, the prosecutor may not comment on the failure of the accused to give evidence
(§ 18(1)(b) Evidence Act 1929 (SA)).
64. This mirrors the changes made to United Kingdom law in 1994; however those
provisions are now subject to the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) and European Convention
on Human Rights, which expressly provide for a right to a fair trial, interpreted to include
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given an opportunity to obtain legal advice about the ramifications of failing
to mention that fact.
In summary, the existing case law does not provide a strong protection
of the right to silence. It has been recognized as an important right, but
liable to being overridden by legislation. Taking this cue, various Australian
Parliaments have passed statutes in different fields that abridge the right to
silence. Some specifically limit the use to which information required to be
given in such circumstances can be used against the person required to
answer the question or provide the information; others only confer this
protection when the person articulates an objection on self-incrimination
grounds before providing it; others don’t limit how such information can
be used. Sometimes, the defense of reasonable excuse is provided as a basis
for noncompliance; sometimes it is not. Sometimes, this defense may
include a self-incrimination argument; sometimes not. These Acts gener-
ally do not distinguish between the provision of information by way of
document and provision of information by way of oral evidence. Most of
the contexts considered have involved proceedings against individuals
rather than corporations. The need for protection of the right to silence
is considered greater in the context of an individual.
I V . HOW OTHER JUR ISD ICT IONS HAVE APPL IED THE
R IGHT TO S I LENCE
It is considered useful to see how other jurisdictions have balanced the
need for law enforcement authorities to have sufficient investigatory
powers to do their job and the civil liberties of individuals to not be unduly
put upon by investigators. The usual rider remains: that these decisions are
based on a different constitutional and human rights context than our
own, and so appropriate care must be taken in transposing the results in
such cases to the Australian context. From a non-Australian legal scholar
perspective, it is interesting to see how other jurisdictions have interpreted
the right, and to consider whether the result in one’s own country would
be the same if the facts of the cases discussed had occurred in one’s own
country.
a right to silence, as we will see in Part III of the article. The New South Wales changes do
not apply to a person under 18 or a person with a mental disability.
THE R IGHT TO S ILENCE | 545
A. Europe
The right to silence is not specifically referred to in the European Con-
vention on Human Rights. However, the Court has confirmed that the
right to silence and the right not to incriminate oneself are ‘‘generally
recognised international standards which lie at the heart of the notion of
a fair procedure’’ (fair trial) under Article 6 of the European Convention.65
It is closely linked with the presumption of innocence.66
Article 6 is technically applicable when a person has been ‘‘charged with
a criminal offence.’’ This has led to controversy and difference of opinion
regarding the precise time at which the right to fair procedure arises. Does
it only apply at the trial itself? Does it apply at an earlier preliminary
stage—once a person is in police custody, once a person has literally been
‘‘charged’’? Does it apply during police questioning on the street or at
a residence? This issue continues to divide the courts.67 However, the
courts have generally given this phrase a broad interpretation, to include
an investigation such as this one, preliminary to possible criminal charges
later.68 The test for the applicability of Article 6(1) is whether that indivi-
dual’s situation has been ‘‘substantially affected’’ rather than literally
whether they have been charged.69 This case also demonstrates that it is
not necessary that the person affected be liable to imprisonment for failure
to comply in order to qualify for the protections.
An alternative argument is to hold, as the Court did in Saunders,70 that
although a preliminary investigation may be ‘‘inquisitorial’’ rather than
judicial, it is the use of the evidence at the subsequent judicial proceeding
—for instance, when the person questioned in the inquisitorial proceedings
65. Zaichenko v. Russia [2010] ECHR 185, [38]; Murray v. United Kingdom [1996]
ECHR 3; K.A. Cavanaugh, Emergency Rule, Normalcy Exception: The Erosion of the Right to
Silence in the United Kingdom, 35 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 491 (2002); Mark Berger, Eur-
opeanizing Self-Incrimination: The Right to Remain Silent in the European Court of Human
Rights, 12 COLUMBIA J. EUR. L. 339 (2006); Mike Redmayne, English Warnings, 30 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 1047 (2009); Diane Amann, A Whipsaw Cuts Both Ways: The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination in an International Context, 45 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1201 (1998).
66. Zaichenko v. Russia [2010] ECHR 185, [38].
67. Ambrose v. Harris [2011] UKSC 43.
68. This point was also confirmed in Murray v. United Kingdom [1996] ECHR 3, [62]
and Saunders v. United Kingdom [1996] 3 ECHR 65.
69. Quinn v. Ireland [2000] ECHR 690, [41].
70. Saunders v. United Kingdom [1996] ECHR 65.
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is subsequently charged with a criminal offense—that attracts Article 6(1).
This was in the course of a case challenging the use of evidence on charges
of breaches of company law derived from an inquisitorial investigation by
inspectors. That law required, on pain of punishment for contempt, a per-
son summoned to answer questions posed by investigators. The privilege
against self-incrimination was not a defense. The Court found that Article
6(1) had been infringed.71
The right to silence is not an absolute one, and primarily it is for
national law to determine rules regarding the admissibility of evidence and
its probative value.72 Although a conviction could not be based solely or
mainly on the accused’s silence, an accused’s silence may be relevant where
the situation calls for an explanation from them, in assessing the strength of
the prosecution case.73 All circumstances must be considered in determin-
ing whether the drawing of adverse inferences from silence was compatible
with Article 6(1), including in what circumstances an inference could be
drawn,74 the weight given to them by national courts in assessing the
evidence, and the degree of compulsion involved.75 The weight of the
71. The Court also clarified that the privilege against self-incrimination did not extend to
material that had an existence independent of the will of the suspect, such as breath, blood,
bodily tissue or urine samples [Saunders at 69], and that it applied to evidence that was
incriminating in either a direct or indirect way [71]. On similar facts in Kansal v. United
Kingdom [2004] ECHR 181, involving an examination by the Official Receiver where the
person was again required, on pain of fine or imprisonment, to answer questions (subject to
a reasonable excuse defense), the Court found the provisions to be incompatible with Article
6(1); Shannon v. United Kingdom [2009] ECHR 2257.
72. Ambrose v. Harris [2011] UKSC 43; Ibrahim v. United Kingdom [2012] ECHR 978,
[95].
73. Averill v. United Kingdom [2000] ECHR 212; Adetoro v. United Kingdom [2010]
ECHR 609.
74. The narrower the imposition, the more likely it is to be valid; an example is a law
requiring a person to identify the driver of a vehicle alleged to have been involved in illegal
activity. This was upheld despite objections that it infringed the privilege against self-
incrimination, because it was only a question, and it applied only in the context of a narrow
range of offenses: Her Majesty’s Advocate General for Scotland v. Brown [2000] UKPC D3;
O’Halloran and Francis v. United Kingdom [2007] ECHR 544. There is also some suggestion
in these cases that if an individual ‘‘chooses’’ to embark on a particular activity, such as driving,
they agree to statutory rules regarding that activity, including a requirement that drivers of
a vehicle identify the owner if called upon to do so, or to stop for a random breath test.
75. Sorokins and Sorokina v. Latvia [2013] ECHR 457, [110]; Murray v. United
Kingdom [1996] ECHR 3, [47]; Adetoro v. United Kingdom [2010] ECHR 609, [49];
Tabbakh v. United Kingdom [2012] ECHR 407, [26]. The degree of compulsion involved
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public interest in the investigation and punishment of the relevant offense,
and the existence of any safeguards in the procedure, have also been con-
sidered.76 Prosecutor arguments that departures from the privilege against
self-incrimination are justified or proportionate to dealing with threats to
national security and terrorism have not convinced the court.77 Propor-
tionality between the alleged justification for the imposition and the extent
of interference with the right to silence will be considered.78 The privilege
extends to indirect as well as direct incrimination.79
Whether the person had access to legal advice at the time they chose to
remain silent is also relevant. Specifically, the court has confirmed it is
perfectly understandable that a person may choose not to answer police
questions when their legal adviser is not present.80 It is also understandable
that a person has relied on advice from their legal representative not to
answer questions asked,81 and summing up directions should not overlook
this.82 Where a lawyer was not present, infringement of the right to silence
will mean the defense was ‘‘irretrievably prejudiced.’’83
B. North America84
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that in
a criminal case, no person shall be compelled to be a witness against
was particularly important in Jalloh v. Germany [2006] ECHR 721, where the accused was
held down while drugs were administered to him in order that he would regurgitate
contents of his system, suspected to include illegal drugs. The court found that such
a procedure did infringe the accused’s privilege against self-incrimination.
76. Jalloh v. Germany [2006] ECHR 721, [117]. Ashworth suggests that where the
privilege against self-incrimination is abrogated, the penalty should take into account that
fact. Ashworth, supra note 15, at 770.
77. Quinn v. Ireland [2000] ECHR 690, [57-58]; Tabbakh v. United Kingdom [2012]
ECHR 407.
78. Her Majesty’s Advocate General for Scotland v. Brown [2000] UKPC D3.
79. Zaichenko v. Russi [2010] ECHR 185, [54].
80. Averill v. United Kingdom [2000] ECHR 212, [49]. This does not mean, of course,
that an assertion of a right to silence when a person’s legal representative is present is
unacceptable.
81. Condron v. United Kingdom [2000] ECHR 191 (there because the person being
questioned was apparently under the influence of drugs at the time).
82. Beckles v. United Kingdom [2002] ECHR 661.
83. Zaichenko v. Russia [2010] ECHR 185, [37].
84. This discussion should not be taken to imply that the author believes the United
States approach is perfect. Specifically, given the difficulties in determining whether
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themselves.85 In the United States, the right to silence was emphatically
asserted in the celebrated decision of Miranda v. Arizona.86 Chief Justice
Warren noted:
The privilege against self-incrimination—the essential mainstay of our
adversary system—is founded on a complex of values. . . .All these policies
point to one overriding thought: the constitutional foundation underlying
the privilege is the respect a government—state or federal—must accord to
the dignity and integrity of its citizens. To maintain a fair state-individual
balance, to require the government to shoulder the entire load, to respect the
inviolability of the human personality, our accusatory system of criminal
justice demands that the government seeking to punish an individual pro-
duce the evidence against him by its own independent labors, rather than by
the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from his own mouth. In sum,
the privilege is fulfilled only when the person is guaranteed the right to
remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his
own will.87
In this case, a majority of the Court held that the Constitution required
someone under ‘‘custodial investigation’’88 to be warned, prior to ques-
tioning, that they had a right to remain silent, that any statement made
may be used in evidence against them, and that they had a right to legal
representation, either retained or appointed.89 The Court referred to the
privilege against self-incrimination as the ‘‘essential mainstay of our adver-
sary system.’’90 The Court went further than previous cases in positively
requiring the investigating authority to inform the person affected of those
someone is under ‘‘custodial investigation,’’ the author questions whether Miranda should
be applicable to any questions asked by police of individuals; the level of awareness of the
individual being asked to waive their rights is arguably too low, and the requirement that the
person must articulate their wish to remain silent can be questioned, as can the different
treatment of testimony and so-called physical evidence, as can the supposed need for a public
safety exception and the constitutionality of existing statutory exceptions. A detailed con-
sideration of these weaknesses is considered to be beyond the scope of this article, but it is
acknowledged here that there are problems with the existing Miranda jurisprudence.
85. The protection applies at both federal and state level: Dickerson v. United States, 530
US 428 (2000).
86. Miranda, 384 US 436 (1966).
87. Id. at 460.
88. This means questioning by a law enforcement officials after a person was taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of their freedom in any significant way (id. at 444).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 460.
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rights. It did this because otherwise, inquiring regarding what an individual
person did or did not know about their rights in any given case would be
speculative. It was necessary to counteract the pressure that the person
detained for questioning would typically be under.91
The U.S. Supreme Court has struck down as being inconsistent with the
privilege a comment by the trial judge that the jury could take into account
a failure of the defendant to deny or explain evidence or facts that they
could reasonably be expected to deny or explain.92 The privilege applies in
any proceedings, civil or criminal, investigatory or adjudicatory.93 In deter-
mining what level of immunity from prosecution might be sufficient to be
consistent with Fifth Amendment requirements, the Court initially took
a very broad view, stating that the person subjected to the questioning
would have to be given absolute immunity against future prosecution for
the offense to which the question relates94; subsequently it has been
deemed sufficient that the person asked the question not have the infor-
mation they supplied, or information derived from information they sup-
plied, be used against them in a subsequent proceeding.95 The person
detained needs to express that they wish to remain silent and/or do not
wish to talk with authorities; a failure to express anything is not enough to
render further police questioning unconstitutional.96 A distinction has
been made between testimony, for which the protection is available, and
‘‘real or physical evidence’’; as a result, it is not a breach of the Fifth
Amendment to extract physical evidence, such as blood from the accused,
without their consent.97 However, sometimes the privilege has extended to
protect a person from having to produce private papers.98
91. Id. at 469.
92. Griffin v. California 380 US 609 (1965).
93. McCarthy v. Arndstein 266 US 34, 40 (1924).
94. Counselman v. Hitchcock 142 US 547, 586 (1892).
95. Kastigar v. United States 406 US 441, 460 (1972). The prosecution would bear the
burden of establishing that the evidence they proposed to use in a subsequent proceeding
against the person questioned was derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of
the compelled testimony. Further, use and derivative use immunity is sufficient; it does not
matter that the person questioned might suffer personal odium or disgrace from having to
answer the questions (Brown v. Walker 161 US 591, 1896).
96. Berghuis v. Van Chester Thompkins 130 S.Ct. 2250 (2010), but precise words are not
required: Quinn v. United States 349 US 155 (1955).
97. Schmerber v. California 384 US 757 (1966)
98. Boyd v. United States 116 US 616 (1886); United States v. Hubbell 530 US 27 (2000).
There is a vast literature on the United States jurisprudence; a sample includes Ronald Allan
550 | NEW CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | VOL . 16 | NO . 4 | FALL 2013
In contrast to Europe where, as indicated, arguments that an exception
to the right to silence in the context of terrorism have not been accepted,99
the Burger Court in New York v. Quarles recognized an exception to
Miranda requirements where public safety considerations outweighed the
right of the person questioned to remain silent.100 Much of the recent
controversy surrounding Miranda has been in the context of investigation
and prosecution of possible terrorist offenses, and whether the Quarles
exception should be applied in such situations,101 whether a new exception
is called for,102 or whether Miranda should be applied in its original form,
regardless of the context of the particular crime being investigated.103
& Kristin Mace, The Self-Incrimination Clause Explained and its Future Predicted, 94(2) J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 243 (2004); Harvey Gee, In Order to Be Silent, You Must First
Speak: The Supreme Court Extends Davis’s Clarity Requirement to the Right to Remain Silent
in Berghuis v Thompkins, 44 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 423 (2011); Michael Pardo, Self-
Incrimination and the Epistemology of Testimony, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1023 (2009); Daniel
Seidman & Alex Stein, The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A Game Theoretical Analysis of
the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 114 HARVARD L. REV. 430 (2000).
99. Quinn v. Ireland [2000] ECHR 690, [57-58], Tabbakh v. United Kingdom [2012]
ECHR 407.
100. Quarles, 467 US 649, 655–56 (1984).
101. An example is United States v. Khalil 214 F.3d 111 (2000), where the Second Circuit
allowed statements of the accused to be admitted in the context of alleged terrorism of-
fenses, despite their being made prior to aMiranda warning; Joanna Wright,Mirandizing
Terrorists? An Empirical Analysis of the Public Safety Exception, 111 COLUMBIA L. REV. 1296
(2011). In H.Res 1413, a member of the U.S. House of Representatives proposes a reso-
lution stating that investigations of alleged terrorism offenses may fall within the Quarles
exception to Miranda, such that the warning would not be necessary. (111th Congress,
introduced May 27, 2010). A similar proposal appeared in the Questioning of Terrorism
Suspects Act 2010 (HR 5934, 111th Congress), though this proposal was not enacted. The
latter proposal also included a ‘‘suggestion’’ that the results of overseas questioning not be
rendered inadmissible due to failure to observe Miranda requirements, provided the
confession was voluntary and reliable. Obviously, the United States observes a strict
separation of powers, and it is doubtful that such a statement would influence the Court
one way or the other on this issue.
102. Mark Godsey, Miranda’s Final Frontier—The International Arena: A Critical
Analysis of United States v Bin Laden, and a Proposal for a NewMiranda Exception Abroad,
51DUKE L.J. 1703 (2002). The Enemy Belligerent Interrogation Detention and Prosecution
Act 2010 calls for an exception to Miranda where ‘‘high–value’’ enemy detainees are being
questioned. This proposal has not yet been enacted.
103. Amos Guiora, Relearning Lessons of History: Miranda and Counterterrorism, 71
LOUISIANA L. REV. 1147 (2011); for example, in United States v. Moussaoui 365 F.3d 292
(2004), the Court of Appeals (Fourth Circuit) affirmed the supremacy of Fifth Amendment
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Exceptions have been legislated.104 The Supreme Court has often insisted,
even in the context of alleged terrorism offenses, that due process be
accorded to those involved.105 As the joint reasoning in Hamdi noted,
It is during our most challenging and uncertain moments that our nation’s
commitment to due process is most severely tested, and it is in those times
that we must preserve our commitment at home to the principles for which
we fight abroad.106
In this light, the constitutional validity of the 2010 Act is open to some
doubt.
In Canada, the right to silence is implicit in § 7 of the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms as being one of the principles of fundamental
justice,107 as well as specifically in §§ 11(c) and 13. The Supreme Court
has called the right to silence the ‘‘chief’’ right of the accused.108 The Court
has emphasized the core of the right as requiring that a detained person
choose whether or not to make a statement to authorities.109 It can be
rights over government claims that evidence should not be revealed, contrary to general due
process expectations.
104. § 1040 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 prohibits the
giving of a Miranda warning to a foreign national captured or detained outside the United
States as an enemy combatant. The constitutional validity of this section is not known,
given that the Supreme Court has found that the Miranda warning is a constitutional
requirement (Dickerson v. United States 530 US 428 (2000)) and that such rights have been
extended in court decisions to interrogations outside the United States (United States v. Bin
Laden 132 F. Supp. 2d 168 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)).
105. Boumediene v. Bush 553US 723 (2008); Rasul v. Bush 542US 466 (2004); Hamdi v.
Rumseld 542 US 507 (2004).
106. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 542 US 507, 532 (Rehnquist CJ, O’Connor, Kennedy and
Breyer JJ, in conclusions with which Souter and Ginsburg JJ concurred). Miranda re-
quirements are also applied with respect to interrogations by American officers of non-
Americans abroad: United States v. Bin Laden 132 F. Supp 2d 168 (S.D.N.Y 2001).
107. R v. Hebert [1990] 2 S.C.R 151.
108. R v. Hebert [1990] 2 S.C.R 151 at 29 (Dickson CJ Lamer, LaForest, L’Heureux-
Dube, Gonthier, Cory and McLachlin JJ). It reflects the common law rules of voluntariness
and the privilege against self-incrimination.
109. In that case, the accused’s appeal was allowed. He had been arrested and charged
with robbery. At the police station, he indicated he did not wish to make a statement.
Subsequently, police placed an undercover police officer in the accused’s cell. The accused
made admissions to the undercover officer, which formed most of the basis of the case
against him. The Supreme Court held that the use of the evidence was contrary to Charter
requirements.
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consistent with such a requirement that police are persistent with their
questioning, even after the accused has indicated they don’t wish to answer
questions.110 The Court has confirmed the application of the rule at a time
prior to the court hearing.111
The Court considered the compatibility of antitrust law provisions
requiring a corporation and some of its officers to attend a hearing with
the right to silence in Thomson Newspapers Limited v. Canada.112 A person
who refused to attend such a hearing could be punished for an offense
against the Act. Evidence obtained through such a process was not gener-
ally admissible against that person in subsequent proceedings.
The case is not entirely satisfactory as a precedent, since only five judges
sat. However, of these, two found that the proceedings were inconsistent
with the right to silence provided for in the Charter, and a third judge
found against the accused because he had apparently challenged the wrong
section. In so doing, that third judge found it ‘‘could be argued’’ that the
section was inconsistent with § 7 of the Charter, violating a fundamental
principle of justice, and he suggested that at most, he might declare invalid
the power to punish a ‘‘silent’’ interrogee for contempt.113 Having
acknowledged this, then, dissentient Wilson J found that the right to
silence applied to the antitrust proceedings, although technically it was
an investigatory rather than prosecutorial step.114 To do otherwise would
render the protection vulnerable. The fact that the provision did not allow
the prosecutor to generally use the evidence obtained through such inquiry
110. R v. Singh [2007] 3 S.C.R 405, where the accused eventually made admissions to
police, after stating on eighteen previous occasions that he did not wish to answer questions.
A bare majority of the Court found the right to silence had not been infringed: McLachlin
CJ, Bastarache, Deschamps, Charron and Rothstein JJ, Binnie, LeBel, Fish and Abella JJ
dissenting.
111. R v. Hebert [1990] 2 S.C.R 151, at 27: ‘‘the relationship between the privilege against
self-incrimination and the right to silence at the investigatory phase is equally clear. The
protection conferred by a legal system which grants the accused immunity from incrimi-
nating himself at trial but offers no protection with respect to pre-trial statements would be
illusory’’ (Dickson CJ Lamer, LaForest, L’Heureux-Dube, Gonthier, Cory and McLachlin
JJ); to like effect Wilson J (at 43–44) and Sopinka J (at 54, stating that the right to remain
silent must arise when the coercive power of the state is imposed on the individual,
including pretrial procedures).
112. [1990] 1 S.C.R 425.
113. Lamer J, id. at 24. (That judge did not eventually do so, for other reasons).
114. Id. at 40.
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against the person who provided the information was not sufficient,
because it could be used to obtain other evidence, which could then
incriminate that person and be used against them.115 Sopinka J agreed
with these findings, and would also have found the antitrust provisions
invalid. However, he drew a distinction between the compelling of oral
testimony and the compelling of documentary evidence, finding the former
invalid, but the latter valid.116 The right to silence should not be limited to
cases where police were asking the questions; the underlying principle was
that it was meant to protect against state investigators—often, but not
limited to, police.117
C. Other International Contexts
Article 14(3)(g) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) provides that in the determination of any criminal charge, the
accused cannot be compelled to testify against themselves.118 The right is
not expressly referred to in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or
the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, though other articles
in these documents may be taken as referring to the privilege against self-
incrimination.119
115. Id. at 62.
116. Id. at 169.
117. Id. at 175. Of the majority, LaForest J did not think the right to silence should apply
to the antitrust proceedings, since they were inquisitorial in nature rather than judicial (114)
and did not involve the determination of criminal liability. LaForest J was satisfied with the
provisions limiting the use to which such evidence could be put against the person providing
the information (118) (as was L’Heureux-Dube (155)). He was concerned with the derivative
use argument raised by the dissenters, but found the solution to this in the general discretion
reposed in the trial judge to exclude evidence on the basis of prejudice or policy (131).
118. The 2012 Report of the Human Rights Committee reports specific breaches of
§ 14(3)(g) by Libya and Tajikistan. The Committee has reminded signatories that under the
requirements of Article 14(3)(g) and others, deriving evidence from compulsion is ‘‘wholly
unacceptable’’: General Comment 13 (1984) { 14; UNHRC Communication No. 588/1994,
Johnson v. Jamaica; Communication No. 253/1987, Kelly v. Jamaica; Communication No.
330/1988, Berry v Jamaica. In General Comment 29 (2001) { 11, it notes that presumption of
innocence is ‘‘fundamental’’ to the requirement that a trial be fair; see alsoGeneral Comment
32 (2007) { 30.
119. Universal Declaration Article 7 (equality), 10 (fair hearing), and 11 (presumption of
innocence); African Charter Article 3 (equality) and 7 (presumption of innocence). The
right is expressly enshrined in § 35(1)(c) of the South African Constitution; see Ferreira v.
Levin, Vryenhoek v. Powell [1996] 3LRC 527.
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A good country to consider by way of example of application of the
ICCPR approach is India, a signatory to the Covenant. Section 20 of that
country’s Constitution is cast in very similar terms to Article 14(3)(g) of the
ICCPR. Section 20 has generally been interpreted in a broad manner. The
Indian Supreme Court has rejected arguments that the protection should
be limited to oral testimony, extending it to orders for the production of
documents. It has also extended the protection outside of the court room,
to include investigatory procedures leading up to trial. However, the Court
has provided law enforcement authorities with loopholes, because it has
confined the protection to cases where the person being asked questions
was truly an ‘‘accused’’ at the relevant time, in the sense. An ‘‘accused’’ here
is someone against whom a formal accusation has been made. The fact that
the person may become an accused after the questioning takes place does
not necessarily mean they were an ‘‘accused’’ at the time of questioning.120
The Court has confined Article 20 to ‘‘criminal proceedings,’’ so that
proceedings other than criminal proceedings do not necessarily attract
Article 20 protection.121
In an important recent case, the Court considered the application of
Article 20 in the context of police use of scientific techniques such as
narcoanalysis, polygraph testing, and a brain electrical activation profile
test to assist with investigation of crime. On occasions, such tests are used
by police against an individual without that individual’s consent. The court
embraced the distinction in United States jurisprudence between ‘‘personal
testimony,’’ relying on an act of will of an individual, and physical evi-
dence, such as body fluid samples, the former attracting constitutional
protection but the latter not necessarily. Applying this distinction in this
case, it found that the use of the above techniques could only be with the
consent of the person involved; forced use of these techniques could,
depending on other factors, infringe Article 20 protections.122
Of real relevance to this article is that the Court went on to consider
whether the use of such techniques might infringe the right to due process
enshrined in Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. It did so in recognition
120. State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad [1961] INSC 233.
121. Selvi v. State of Karnataka [2010] INSC 340. The Court has also introduced an
objective aspect to the right, finding that the refusal to answer a question based on belief that
it might incriminate the questionee must have some kind of reasonable basis, and cannot be
far-fetched or fanciful: Satpathy v. Dani (P.L)[1978] INSC 82.
122. Selvi v. State of Kamataka [2010] INSC 340.
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of the limitations of the application of Article 20, specifically action against
an ‘‘accused’’ and in the context of ‘‘criminal process.’’ The Court recog-
nized that if either of these criteria were not met, Article 20 would not
apply, so considered the possible application of Article 21, the broad due
process protection. It specifically found that nonconsentual use of these
techniques would violate due process, and the use of the results of such
questioning would violate the right to a fair trial.
Another category of countries is characterized by references to some
fundamental liberties in the Constitution, but not (expressly) the right
to silence. Examples here include Singapore and Malaysia; the Constitu-
tion of both countries contain an express reference to general rights like
equal protection, but not specifically the right to silence or presumption of
innocence. Though Singaporean statutes expressly allow inferences to be
drawn from silence,123 there has been some recognition in recent Singa-
porean decisions of the right of an accused to a fair trial.124 It is possible
that, in future, a Singaporean court might hold that the drawing of infer-
ences from silence is not consistent, or may not be consistent, with the
right to a fair trial.125
This brief outline of the international jurisprudence supports the dis-
cussion of the history of the right in showing the fundamental nature of the
right to silence in various common law jurisdictions, courts’ (general)
rejection of the idea that a failure to give evidence can be used to draw
inferences, the precise scope of the right, that the person must articulate
that they wish to exercise the right, its application in so-called extreme
contexts such as terrorism, and in Europe, that the right to silence has been
expressly connected with the right to a fair trial. This is particularly impor-
tant to the Australian context where, as will be seen in the following part,
our courts have recognized a constitutional right to fair trial or fair proce-
dure. Through this means, it can be argued that the Australian Constitu-
tion recognizes a right to silence as part of the right to a fair trial. This is
a novel argument that to the author’s knowledge has not been developed
elsewhere, so it is considered worthy of extended treatment.
123. Public Prosecutor v. Chee Cheong Hin Constance [2006] SGHC 9.
124.Goh KahHeng v. Public Prosecutor and Another CriminalMotion [2009] SGHC 61.
125. This is of course dependant on other factors beyond the scope of this article,
including the independence of the judiciary. The author is not aware of any cases that have
taken this step to date.
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V . THE CONST I TUT IONAL PROTECT ION OF THE R IGHT
TO A FA IR TR IAL OR FA IR PROCEDURE IN AUSTRAL IA
How then can the right to silence be more strongly protected in Australia?
This article has indicated the High Court of Australia’s view that properly
worded legislation will have the effect of overriding such a fundamental
right. Do constitutional mechanisms exist to protect the right in a stronger
way, and can the international materials alluded to above be utilized to
support a stronger protection of the right in Australia at the constitutional
level? The argument now to be developed is that the High Court has
already recognized the right to a fair trial and to fair procedure. Further,
it has insisted on a strict separation of powers and denied the legislature the
constitutional power to require courts to act in a nonjudicial manner. It is
submitted that through either of these arguments, or through a combina-
tion of the two, an Australian court could more strongly protect the right to
silence.
Five members of the High Court of Australia in the landmark decision
of Dietrich v. The Queen126 found that the right to a fair trial was funda-
mental to the Australian legal system.127 Some of them based this right on
the implicit requirements of Chapter III of the Constitution, which estab-
lished the judicial branch of government.128 Members of the Court also
126. Dietrich v. The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292, at 311 (Mason CJ and McHugh J), 326
(Deane J), 353 (Toohey J), and 362 (Gaudron J); see also Jago v. District Court (NSW)(1989)
168 CLR 23, per Mason CJ (29), Deane J (56), Toohey J (72) and Gaudron J (75).
127. Id., seeMason CJ and McHugh (298), Deane J (326), Toohey J (353), and Gaudron J
(362); these concepts would be encapsulated by the American concept of due process, but
the Australian courts are yet to formally accept that the notion of due process is or should be
considered to be implicit in Australia’s constitutional arrangements; Fiona Wheeler, Due
Process, Judicial Power and Chapter III in the New High Court, 32 FED. L. REV. 205 (2004);
Janet Hope, A Constitutional Right to a Fair Trial? Implications for the Reform of the Aus-
tralian Criminal Justice System, 24 FED. L. REV. 173 (1996).
128. Dietrich v. The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 272, see Deane J (326) and Gaudron J (362).
My reading of the joint judgment of Mason CJ and McHugh J, and that of Toohey J (these
being the other judges who accepted the notion of a fair trial) does not disclose the basis on
which they found such a right (311); at that page, Mason CJ and McHugh J they merely
assert it ‘‘for the above reasons.’’ They did in their reasons refer to international materials
concerning the right to a fair trial, including the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. None of these judges
disagreed with the express view of Deane and Gaudron JJ that the right to a fair trial was
constitutionally entrenched.
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alluded to the Court’s inherent power to stay proceedings to prevent what
would otherwise be an abuse of process.129 This was in the course of
rejecting an argument that an accused had a right to publicly funded legal
representation; however, the Court found that unless exceptional circum-
stances existed, a court should generally adjourn proceedings against an
accused charged with a serious offense who, through no fault of their own,
was not able to obtain legal representation, until legal representation was
available.130 This would usually be necessary to ensure the accused obtained
a fair trial.
In reaching this conclusion, members of the High Court referred liber-
ally to international materials in determining the content of a fair trial,
including Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights131 and American Bill of Rights case law on the meaning of a fair
trial.132 There is ample precedent for international materials being used to
help interpret the requirements of the Australian Constitution. A leading
example appears in the judgment of Kirby J in Al-Kateb v. Godwin:
The complete isolation of constitutional law from the dynamic impact of
international law is neither possible nor desirable today. That is why
national courts, and especially national constitutional courts such as this,
have a duty, so far as possible, to interpret their constitutional texts in a way
that is generally harmonious with the basic principles of international law,
including as that law states human rights and fundamental freedoms.133
It may be conceded that since the Dietrich decision, there have not been
any High Court cases that have applied the express concept of the right to
129. Id., see Mason CJ and McHugh J (298).
130. Id., see Mason CJ and McHugh J (315), Deane J (337), and Toohey J (356–57).
131. Id. at 300 (Mason CJ and McHugh JJ) and 360 (Toohey J)
132. Including the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, see id. at 302 (Mason CJ and
McHugh J), 333 (Deane J), 359 (Toohey J), and 370–71 (Gaudron J).
133. Al-Kateb v. Godwin (2004) 219CLR 562, 624. Recent examples where the High Court
has made extensive use of international materials in interpreting constitutional requirements
include Betfair Pty Ltd v. Western Australia (2008) 234 CLR 318 and Roach v. Electoral
Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 162; there is a significant academic jurisprudence—a sample
includes HILARY CHARLESWORTH, MADELINE CHIAM, DEVIKA HOVELL, & GEORGE
WILLIAMS, NO COUNTRY IS AN ISLAND (2006); Hilary Charlesworth, Madeline Chiam,
Devika Hovell, & GeorgeWilliams,Deep Anxieties: Australia and the International Legal Order
25(4) SYDNEY L. REV. 424 (2003); Hilary Charlesworth, Dangerous Liaisons: Globalisation
and Australian Public Law, 20 ADEL. L. REV. 57 (1998).
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a fair trial, at least in those terms. In response, however, firstly, the decision
has never been overruled. Secondly, since the Dietrich decision, we have
seen a substantial jurisprudence develop on Chapter III of the Australian
Constitution, and in particular the need for the judiciary to be, and be seen
to be, independent of the other arms of government, that public confidence
in the independence of the judiciary not be undermined, and that courts
not be given powers that would require or allow it to engage in activities
contrary to traditional notions of judicial process.134 Although these deci-
sions are not expressly based on notions of a fair trial per se, the reasoning is
often highly analogous to fair trial reasoning.135 In other words, a court
asked or required to act in ways antithetical to the judicial process is being
asked to conduct an unfair trial. So, while it is conceded that the High
Court has not applied the Dietrich principle expressly in subsequent cases,
it is argued that in the development of the so-called Kable principle,136
a close analogy is apparent in at least some of the applications of the Kable
doctrine, such that it is considered that the principle that the Constitution
enshrines a right to a fair trial remains current law.
134. Examples include Kable v. Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW)(1996) 189 CLR
51; Totani v. South Australia (2010) 242 CLR 1; and International Finance Trust Co Ltd v.
New South Wales Crime Commission (2009) 240 CLR 319.
135. For example, in the International Finance Trust decision, Gummow and Bell JJ, in
striking down the provisions on the so-called Kable principle, discuss how the Court is
conscripted for a process requiring mandatory ex parte sequestration of property upon mere
suspicion, no requirement of full disclosure, and a reverse onus. While they use this in
applying the Kable principle and determine the provisions to be offensive to it and uncon-
stitutional, similar reasoning may apply in the different context here.
136. This is the principle that a court must not be given powers that would cause an
outsider to consider that the court’s independence was being compromised, or undermine
public confidence in the judiciary as a repository of judicial power. The precise facts
involved a law allowing a court to order an offender (named in the enabling legislation) to be
incarcerated for a further period beyond his originally allotted sentence, if the court was
satisfied that he was more likely than not to re-offend. Ordinary rules of evidence were not
applicable, and the legislation confirmed that in making its decision, the most important
factor for the court to consider was the need for community protection. By a majority of
4–2, the High Court struck out the legislation as being constitutionally invalid, contrary to
the separation of powers for which Chapter III of the Australian Constitution provided
(Kable v. Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51). It is interesting to
consider whether U.S. or European jurisprudence would benefit from the development
of something like the Kable principle, though the need for such a doctrine in those jurisdic-
tions may be lessened by the existence of human rights recognition at constitutional and
international convention levels.
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Perhaps the best example of this argument appears in the recent High
Court decision in Wainohu v. New South Wales.137 There French CJ and
Kiefel J refer to procedural fairness as being a defining characteristic of
a court.138 Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, and Bell JJ expressly agreed with
comments by Gaudron J in an earlier case139 that confidence in judicial
officers depended on their acting in accordance with ‘‘fair and proper
procedures.’’140 Heydon J assumed these statements were correct, for the
purposes of argument.141
Other examples of this appear in International Finance Trust where the
High Court determined the regime to be offensive to the so-called Kable
principle discussed above. For instance, Gummow and Bell JJ pointed to
the conscription of the judiciary into mandatory ex parte sequestration of
property, lack of full disclosure, and a reverse onus. They concluded this
involved the court in an activity ‘‘repugnant in a fundamental degree to the
judicial process as understood and conducted throughout Australia.’’142
Another way of expressing this would have been to say that these features
of the proceedings meant that the proceeding was not a ‘‘fair’’ one; in other
words, the result and the reasoning is similar to what would have occurred
if the Dietrich notion of a fair trial had have been applied.
In another in this line of cases, Totani, French CJ repeatedly used the
word ‘‘fair’’ in considering the requirements of the system of courts for
which Chapter III provides.143 He indicated that fairness was a defining
137. Wainohu v. New South Wales (2011) 243 CLR 181.
138. Id. at 208.
139. Wilson v. Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs (1996) 189 CLR
1, 22: ‘‘the effective resolution of controversies which call for the exercise of the judicial
power of the Commonwealth depends on public confidence in the court in which that
power is vested. And public confidence depends on . . . their acting openly, impartially and
in accordance with fair and proper procedures.’’
140. Wainohu, supra note 137, at 225.
141. Id. at 240; see recently Assistant Commissioner Condon v. Pompano Pty Ltd (2013) 87
ALJR 458, where Gageler J found that the Australian Constitution mandated procedural
fairness as an ‘‘immutable characteristic’’ of all Australian courts.
142. International Finance Trust (2010) 240 CLR 319, 367.
143. Totani, (2010) 242 CLR 1, 43. Interestingly, that judge has also indicated some
reservation about importing the concept of ‘‘due process’’ into Australian constitutional law
(International Finance Trust (2009) 240 CLR 319, 353). What is not known is whether there
is a large substantive difference between ‘‘fair’’ and ‘‘due process.’’ In the absence of the Fifth
Amendment, it is submitted an American scholar would likely argue against abrogation of
the right to silence on the basis of due process.
560 | NEW CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | VOL . 16 | NO . 4 | FALL 2013
characteristic of courts.144 His judgment in International Finance Trust
similarly refers to requirements of ‘‘fairness,’’ in invalidating as contrary
to Chapter III of the Constitution, provisions requiring substantial depar-
ture from typical judicial process.145
It is argued here that part of the constitutional right to a fair trial/fair
process that the High Court of Australia first recognized in Dietrich, and
which appears in cases like Wainohu, Totani, and International Finance
Trust, is the right to silence. This does not seem to be a radical proposition,
given that: the European Court has said that the right to silence is funda-
mental to a fair trial required by Article 6 of the European Convention146;
the Canadian Supreme Court has found that it is part of ‘‘fundamental
justice’’ required by § 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms147; the United States Supreme Court has declared it to be an ‘‘essen-
tial mainstay’’ of the adversarial system148 to which Australia also adheres;
it is given as an example of a fair trial right in the South African Consti-
tution149; the Indian Supreme Court recently included it within the right
to a fair trial and due process150; and the High Court of Australia has itself
declared it to be a deep-rooted right and cardinal principle. Further, in the
famous United States case in which the right was emphatically asserted,
Miranda v. Arizona, the court linked the right with the right to counsel.
The High Court has accepted that the right to a fair trial will usually
require counsel. In Dietrich, Mason CJ and McHugh JJ expressly referred
144. Totani, id. at 43 (‘‘courts of the states continue to bear the defining characteristics of
courts, and in particular . . . fairness’’), 45 (referring to ‘‘fairness’’ as an essential characteristic
of courts), 47 (referring to ‘‘procedural fairness’’ as being central to the judicial function); in
the Full Court of South Australia decision in Totani, Bleby J, with whom Kelly J agreed,
referred in his reasons for invalidating the legislation the fact that the control order regime
denied ‘‘the right to a fair hearing’’ ((2009) 105 SASR 244, 283). In Royal Aquarium and
Summer and Winter Garden Society Ltd v. Parkinson [1892] 1QB 431, Fry LJ spoke of fairness
as characteristic of proceedings in courts (at 447); see also Nicholas v. The Queen (1998) 193
CLR 173, 208–209 (Gaudron J).
145. International Financial Trust (2009) 240 CLR 319, 338 (explaining that the section
was invalid because it ‘‘restricts the application of procedural fairness in the judicial pro-
cess’’), 354 (‘‘procedural fairness lies at the heart of the judicial function’’).
146. Murray v. United Kingdom [1996] ECHR 3.
147. R v. Hebert [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151.
148. Miranda v. United States 384 US 436 (1966) (Warren CJ, for the majority).
149. § 35(3)(h) of the South African Constitution.
150. Selvi v. State of Karnataka [2010] INSC 340.
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with evident approval to Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights in elaborating on the requirements of a fair trial. Article
14(3)(g) refers expressly to the privilege against self-incrimination, requiring
that a person not be compelled to testify against themselves or to confess
guilt, as one of the minimum guarantees in a criminal proceeding.
The Australian Independent National Security Legislation Monitor
recently expressly alluded to the issue of the possible inconsistency between
the abrogation of the privilege against self-incrimination in Australian law
and international law:
It is a large question, that ought not simply go by assumption, whether these
provisions (abolition of privilege against self-incrimination provisions) are
consistent with Australia’s international human rights obligations.151
The Report adds that because such abrogations are given effect to fre-
quently in Australia,
This issue cannot be given top priority. It does seem as if the pass has been
sold on statutory abrogations of this privilege.152
This author does not ‘‘buy the pass’’ and submits that the Australian
High Court should not buy the pass. The fact that Parliaments have
‘‘pushed the envelope’’ in this regard does not make it constitutionally
valid or consistent with international law. The American courts have been
instructive in this regard, upholding fundamental human rights principles
even in the extreme context of terrorism. It is submitted that an Australian
court should take a similar perspective.
The author has emphasized here what might be considered to be quite
a noncontentious point because there is no Australian authority that has
established that the right to silence is protected by the right to a fair trial
established by the Australian Constitution.153 Indeed, there are precedents
151. BRET WALKER, INDEPENDENT NATIONAL SECURITY LEGISLATION MONITOR
ANNUAL REPORT 33 (2011). Earlier in the report, Walker claims that to suggest that such
abrogations against the privilege against self-incrimination were in principle inappropriate
would be ‘‘absurd’’ (27). With respect, the author disagrees.
152. Id. at 33.
153. The only reference (oblique, at that) in any judgment to this appears in the decision
of Kirby J (dissenting) in Carr v. Western Australia (2007) 232 CLR 138, 172, where he refers
to the need for the prosecution to prove its case. He suggests that this requirement ‘‘may
even be implied in the assumption about fair trial in the federal Constitution.’’ There are
obviously very close links between the presumption of innocence and the privilege against
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to the contrary. Australian precedents to which this article have previously
alluded have indicated that although the court will presume that an act is
not intended to alter fundamental common law rights like the privilege
against self-incrimination, if the intention of the legislature is clear enough,
the right would have to yield to the legislature’s will. The decisions in
Hammond and Sorby are clear evidence of that philosophy in this context.
However, such cases were decided before the High Court’s decision in
Dietrich recognizing a constitutional right to a fair trial, and it is submitted
that their ongoing correctness must for that reason be in doubt. They are
not considered to be a bar to the argument pressed here.
The suggestion is that the Australian legislation alluded to in Part II of
this article must, to the extent that infringes the right to silence, be closely
scrutinized to assess compatibility with the right to a fair trial/fair proce-
dure. It is conceded that this right is not absolute, so some interferences
with the right to silence may be acceptable.154 The sophisticated approach
taken by the European Court is worth considering here, taking into
account a number of issues in weighing the right to silence against com-
peting values.155
It may be objected that in each of the Australian Acts referred to earlier,
the demand for information occurs at an investigatory or preliminary stage
of proceedings, such that the right to silence is not applicable, because it
applies (constitutionally) to a ‘‘trial.’’ There are two answers to this; the first
self-incrimination. However, the author has not found a case where Kirby J specifically
stated that the privilege against self-incrimination was part of the right to a fair trial provided
for in the Constitution.
154. The Australian courts may like to consider whether there should be separate
treatment for oral testimony and physical records, as occurs in the United States in par-
ticular and to some extent in Europe, and (relatedly) whether it is relevant to take into
account whether the information had an existence independent of the person being asked to
provide it. Examples would include evidence derived from body tissue, urine, blood, breath
etc. Similarly, information with little or no potential to incriminate the person, such as their
name and address, might be lawfully demanded by police.
155. As earlier discussed, these include the circumstances in which the implication could
be drawn, the weight given to the evidence, degree of compulsion, public interest in the
investigation and prosecution of those kinds of cases including proportionality, safeguards
built into the procedure, whether the activity the subject of the questioning was an activity
that the person chose voluntarily to participate in and so may have acquiesced in a limiting
of their rights in that limited context, whether the person was legally represented at the
hearing, and perhaps, that the penalty for breach specifically takes into account the fact that
a fundamental right was taken away.
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is to say that at least some Australian judges,156 as well as overseas courts,157
have found that the right does extend to the investigatory stage, since it is
sufficiently proximate to possible subsequent criminal proceedings that
would involve a ‘‘trial.’’ The second is to say, just as the Supreme Court
of India has, that whereas the questioning might be permitted and those
proceedings not stayed per se, the actual use of the information obtained as
a result of ‘‘forced’’ answering at any subsequent proceeding could be
challenged on the basis that the use of such evidence would infringe the
right to a fair trial.158
As indicated, the Australian Acts differ in the extent to which the
information gained by such proceedings may be used against the person.
However, even those that offer the strongest protection to the use of that
information don’t forbid the use of information derived from the informa-
tion provided, as the United States Supreme Court has required.159 It is
difficult to justify requirements in some of the Australian Acts that, for the
use immunity to apply, the person being questioned must actually assert
their objection to the information being provided on self-incrimination
grounds prior to handing over the information.160 This assumes a level of
knowledge of the law, and an ability and willingness to assert rights in
a difficult situation, that seems unrealistic, especially when there is no
guarantee that a lawyer acting for the person will be present.
To the extent that the Acts under question expressly deny the applica-
bility of the privilege against self-incrimination, this is not thought to bar
a court finding that admission of such evidence would infringe a constitu-
tional right to a fair trial/fair procedure. Legislation must yield to the
Constitution in the event of incompatibility. The High Court of Australia
has struck down on several recent occasions process created by statute that
156. Pyneboard v. Trade Practices Commission (1983) 152 CLR 328, Mason ACJ, Wilson
Dawson JJ (341), and Murphy (346); Brennan J disagreeing.
157. Murray v. United Kingdom [1996] ECHR 3; Funke v. France [1993] ECHR 7;
Thomson Newspapers Ltd v. Canada [1990] S.C.R 425; Miranda v. Arizona 384 US 436
(1966); Selvi v. State of Karnataka [2010] INSC 340 (Europe, Canada, United States, India).
158. The Indian Supreme Court found in Selvi v. State of Kamataka [2010] INSC 340
that use of information derived from a person involuntarily using processes such as poly-
graphs conflicted with the right to a fair trial.
159. Kastigar v. United States 406 US 441 (1972).
160. This differs from the United States position, which requires merely that the person
being questioned assert their wish to remain silent.
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the Court deemed to be an unfair one, on the basis that this was contrary to
the requirements of Chapter III of the Constitution, asking or requiring the
court to act in a nonjudicial manner, and undermining public confidence
in the judiciary and the separation of powers for which the Constitution
provides.161
SUMMARY OF LESSONS LEARNED AND CONCLUS ION
The lessons learned from a consideration of the international materials, and
their implications for other countries including my own, can be summa-
rized here in advance of the conclusion:
 The right to silence is a fundamental human right of longstanding
origin, recognized by a range of national and international human
rights instruments.
 There is an inherent tension between the desire of law enforcement
authorities to have sufficient powers at their disposal to investigate
crime to make society as safe as possible, and fundamental human
rights, such as the right to silence. Utilitarianism competes with
liberalism in this context.
 Jurisdictions such as the United States and Europe have generally
asserted the primacy of the individual’s right to silence over other
interests, though the right is not absolute, as a key component of the
right to a fair trial/fair process and as reinforcing presumption of
innocence.
 Courts must not be invited to draw adverse inferences from an
accused’s right to silence.
 The right should not be narrowly drawn, and should extend to
preliminary investigatory procedures, as well as court proceedings,
and to both civil and criminal proceedings.
 Arguably, narrowing concepts such as requiring that the person
questioned be under ‘‘custodial investigation’’ (United States) or
that the person be an ‘‘accused’’ (India) should be abandoned.
 Limits on the use to which compelled testimony may be put need to
be carefully drawn, including derivative use.
161. Wainohu v. New South Wales (2011) 243 CLR 181; South Australia v. Totani (2010)
242 CLR 1; International Finance Trust Company Limited v. New South Wales Crime
Commission (2009) 240 CLR 319.
THE R IGHT TO S ILENCE | 565
 Courts might insist that the person questioned demonstrate by some
means that they understand the warning they have been given,
perhaps by explaining the warning back to the investigator in their
own words (which is recorded).
 No exceptions should exist to the rule where public safety is
involved, or involving enemy belligerents; such exceptions may be
seen to be contrary to the rule of law.
 There is doubt whether the existing distinction between testimony
and so-called physical evidence can or should be maintained.
 The individual questioned should not be required to articulate their
wish to remain silent.
 Arguably, the person’s belief that the information requested would
incriminate them should not be subject to an objective test.
 Australian courts have recognized the right to a fair trial, as interna-
tional courts have, but so far they have not expressly linked fair trial to
right to silence, as other countries have done.This step should be taken.
 Other countries without an express bill of rights, with a bill of rights
but not expressly including right to silence (Singapore and Malay-
sia), or with an express right to silence but limited to certain situa-
tions (India) could use the concept of fair trial/fair process to
constitutionally enshrine a right to silence in a broad range of cases.
The absence of an express bill of rights has meant that Australian leg-
islatures continue to impinge on the right to silence, a right with a long
heritage and which was only recognized after many centuries of competing
philosophy. The rationale for the retention of the right to silence is as
applicable today as it ever was, and the fundamental nature of such a right
is reinforced in case law in Europe and North America, and in some
countries that adhere to the ICCPR. Consistent with the presumption of
innocence, with liberal values, and in recognition of the power that gov-
ernment has over the individual, it is for the government to prove the truth
of an accusation they make, and an individual should not be required to
assist the government to make its case, on pain of punishment. Yet this is
what current Australian provisions do at the pretrial stage. However, in
countries like Australia, in the absence of an express bill of rights, this is
a tough argument to make.
This article has argued that the right to silence should be recognized as part
of the right to a fair trial/fair procedure, and recognized as a constitutional
requirement by the Australian High Court in Dietrich and more recently in
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Wainohu and others, and that this right should extend to pretrial pro-
ceedings to give it substance. Existing limits on the use to which com-
pelled evidence may be put in later proceedings fall short of what is
acceptable, bearing in mind the standards created by the American courts.
The European Courts have reinforced the right, albeit not absolute, of
a person to not provide information to authorities, as part of the funda-
mental right to a fair trial. A more nuanced approach to the right in
Australia is favored, taking into account the kinds of factors to which
the European courts have alluded, in assessing the extent of the right in
a given case. However, the existence of the right cannot be made to
depend, as some of the Australian Acts suggest, on whether the person
affected happens to mention it before providing the information. This
protects only those who are extremely well informed of their rights, or
those with a quick-minded legal representative, and compromises those
who are most vulnerable.
Australia (and other nations without an express bill of rights, or without
a specific constitutional protection of the right to silence) should take
America’s lead (recent legislation aside) and refuse to accept arguments
that denial of fundamental rights becomes okay when dealing with extreme
offenses like terrorism. There is an interminable slippery slope problem
with such an approach. The American position is not perfect, and improve-
ments have been suggested in terms of ensuring that the person questioned
does in fact understand the rights they are waiving, extending the circum-
stances in which the warning must be given, and not requiring the person
to articulate their wish to avail themselves of the right. Legislative directions
that a court could take into account the failure to speak at an earlier
occasion when an explanation might reasonably have been called for, when
the person later decides to speak, apparent in current United Kingdom law
and in a proposed Australian law, should similarly not be countenanced.
The American courts have shown leadership in finding that such provisions
cannot be reconciled with the fundamental right to silence nor with the
need for the accuser to prove the truth of their accusation at the required
standard.
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